State of Utah v. Michael Ziegleman, Brent Ziegleman : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
State of Utah v. Michael Ziegleman, Brent
Ziegleman : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Todd Utzinger; Assistant Utah Attorney General; Attorney for Plaintiff.
W. Andrew McCollough; McCollough, Jones & Ivins; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Michael Ziegleman, Brent Ziegleman, No. 940448 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6103
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON, 
Defendant, 
and 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
000O000 
Interlocutory Appeal from Order of 
Fourth District Court of Juab County 
Hon. Lynn W. Davis 
Case No. 940448-CA 
Priority No. 10 
W. Andrew McCullough (2170) 
McCullough, Jones & Ivins 
853 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Todd Utzinger 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON, 
Defendant , 
and 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
000O000 
Interlocutory Appeal from Order of 
Fourth District Court of Juab County 
Hon. Lynn W. Davis 
Case No. 940448-CA 
Priority No. 10 
W. Andrew McCullough (2170) 
McCullough, Jones & Ivins 
853 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Todd Utzinger 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE . 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON REMAND IN NOT ADDRESSING THE 
ISSUE FOR WHICH THIS CASE WAS REMANDED 8 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MOST 
IMPORTANT ISSUE ON REMAND IS THE FLAGRANCY OF THE 
OFFICER'S CONDUCT 10 
POINT III. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION AND THE CONSENT 
TO SEARCH 18 
CONCLUSION 30 
CASES CITED 
Brown V. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416 
(U.S. 1975) 27-28 
Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992) . . 24 
State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) 11 
State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1994) Cert, denied. 883 
P.2d 1359, (Utah 1994) 21-23 
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) 23 
State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994) 27 
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) 11 
State v. Hubbard, 861 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1993) 21 
State v. Ribe. 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994) 23 
State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990) 16-17 
State v. Shoulderbladef 258 P.2d 1049 (Utah App. 1993) cert, 
granted. 858 P.2d 1049 (Utah 1994) 20-21 
State v. Sims 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994) 25 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 11-13 
United States v. McSwain. 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994) . . 25-30 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
Page 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United 
States of America 2 
Amendment XIV § 1 to the Constitution of the United 
States of America 2 
Article I § 14 of the Constitution of Utah 3 
STATUTES CITED 
Page 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) U.C.A 3 
§ 77-7-15 U.C.A. as amended 3 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) U.C.A. (1953) as amended 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON, 
Defendant, 
and 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
oooOooo 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 940448-CA 
oooOooo 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an interlocutory appeal in a felony criminal matter, 
involving the appeal of a decision of the Fourth District Court of 
Juab County not to suppress evidence against Defendants which 
Defendants claimed was seized in violation of their constitutional 
rights. Jurisdiction of this court to hear such an appeal is 
granted by § 78-2a-3(2)(e) U.C.A. (1953) as amended. The rule of 
appellate procedure governing interlocutory appeals is Rule 5; and 
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permission to proceed with this appeal has been previously granted 
by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issue presented in this appeal is as follows: 
"Whether the consent [to the search of Defendant's motor 
vehicle] was obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality . . . or, in other words, whether the 'taint' 
of the Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently 
attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence." 
(State v. Ziegleman unpublished memorandum decision dated 
September 9, 1993, at p.2). 
The Findings of Fact in such cases will not be disturbed 
unless those findings were "clearly erroneous". The 
Conclusions of Law made by the court, after examining the 
facts, are reviewed "under a correctness standard." See 
State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States of 
America. 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Amendment XIV § 1 to the Constitution of the United States of 
America. 
[Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
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they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I § 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
§ 77-7-15 U.C.A. as amended 
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect -
Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal in a felony criminal matter. 
Defendant and Appellant is charged in a criminal Information filed 
in the Fourth District Court, Juab County, with a second degree 
felony of knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine with 
intent to distribute, contrary to § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) U.C.A. 
Appellant Brent Ziegleman, and his Co-Defendant, Michael 
McNaughton, who has not joined in this interlocutory appeal, filed 
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motions to suppress evidence, and Appellant filed a Memorandum in 
Support of that Motion. A hearing on the Motion to Suppress 
Evidence was held before Hon. George E. Ballif, on November 5, 
1991. By order of May 7, 1992, the Motion to Suppress Evidence was 
denied. A Petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal 
was filed on May 29, 1992; and an order granting permission to file 
the interlocutory appeal was made by this Court on July 1, 1992. 
By unpublished memorandum opinion, dated September 9, 1993, 
this Court reversed the decision of Judge Ballif, and remanded for 
further proceedings in the trial court. This Court upheld the 
validity of the initial stop of Defendant; but the Court held that 
the continued detention of Defendant for matters outside the scope 
of the initial stop, and outside the scope of an investigation as 
to whether the vehicle was stolen, was illegal. Based on the 
legality of the continued detention, this Court remanded to the 
trial court for a further determination of whether the consent to 
search was tainted by the prior illegality. The trial court, Hon. 
Lynn W. Davis, found that "there would be absolutely no deterrent 
effect accomplished by suppressing the cocaine seized from the 
vehicle." Based on the lack of a deterrent effect on further 
illegal police conduct, the trial court denied Defendant's motion 
to suppress. The court's order denying Defendant's motion to 
suppress was dated July 26, 1994. On August 3, 1994 Defendant 
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Brent Ziegleman once again filed a petition for permission to file 
an interlocutory appeal. This Court, for a second time, granted 
this Defendant's petition, on September 20, 1994. 
While a short evidentiary hearing was held in front of Judge 
Davis, Defendant alleges that none of the evidence introduced at 
that time is significant to this appeal; and the record of that 
hearing has not been requested. All references to the transcript 
of the evidentiary hearing will be to the original suppression 
hearing held before Hon. George E. Ballif. 
On the morning of July 20, 1991, Trooper Lance Bushnell, of 
the Utah Highway Patrol was southbound, just south of Nephi, Juab 
County, on Interstate 15 (T.7). He observed a vehicle traveling 
north, across the median, and estimated the speed of the other 
vehicle at 75 miles per hour (T.8). He turned and approached the 
vehicle from behind, and found that the vehicle was now traveling 
at 60 miles per hour (T.9). At first he saw one head in the car, 
and then saw another one come up in the back seat, as if he had 
been awakened by the officer's approach. As he pulled up along 
side the vehicle, he intended to give the driver a hand signal to 
keep his speed down (T.9). He did not intend to stop the vehicle, 
because he had been unable to pace him and determine for sure that 
there had been a speeding violation (T.8-9; 24). The driver and 
the passenger, however, stared ahead and would not look at him, 
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"both consciously trying not to look at me. Almost like they were 
guilty" (T.10; 29). The officer, acting on the looks of guilt, and 
observing that both persons in the vehicle were "obviously 
nervous," initiated a stop. He did not intend to issue a citation; 
but did intend to issue a warning and investigate further the 
nervousness and "guilty" demeanor (T.31). 
Trooper Bushnell asked Mr. Ziegleman, the driver of the 
vehicle, for a driver license and vehicle registration. He was 
provided with an insurance paper indicating that the car belonged 
to William Kayler, but no registration (T.10-11). Mr. Ziegleman 
gave the name of the owner of the car as "Bill," and said he had 
borrowed it for a trip to California and was returning home to 
Minnesota. He didn't seem to remember Bill's last name until he 
produced the insurance papers (T.36-37). Officer Bushnell called 
in the car information to his dispatcher to inquire about a 
possible stolen vehicle, and received a negative report. The 
occupants remained very nervous and overly polite, which just 
increased his suspicions (T.12-13; 43). Mr. McNaughton was so 
nervous that he dropped the contents of his wallet on the ground, 
while attempting to look for identification (T.14). The officer 
asked for permission to search the vehicle, after asking if the 
vehicle contained drugs, weapons or narcotics (T.12-13). The 
search request was based primarily on the demeanor of the occupants 
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and his feeling that "something was going on" (T.40; 53). 
The officer started a search of the vehicle, locating first a 
package of rolling papers in a tennis shoe in the back seat (T.14). 
Neither occupant would admit ownership of the rolling papers, which 
seemed odd, because the papers themselves were not illegal. By 
this time officer Bushnell and the Deputy Sheriff who was with him 
(but did not testify) had satisfied themselves that they were going 
to find evidence of a crime (T.45, 48). While the search was 
conducted, the Defendants "were both really intent on watching the 
car" (T.16). Eventually the officer searched under the hood, and 
found a package of cocaine, approximately 1 kilogram in weight, 
under an oily rag near the battery (T.16-17). When he searched 
under the hood, he was specifically looking for drugs, and 
primarily because of body language (specifically, the Defendants 
looked away, as he got closer) he was pretty sure of finding some 
(T.44-45, 52-53). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court below did not seriously consider the issue 
that was given to it on remand: That of attenuation of the illegal 
conduct from the consent to search. The trial court, upon remand, 
wrongfully concentrated only on the issue of deterrence, and did 
not validly decide the issue. 
The Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of 
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the State of Utah, require that a police officer may not use his 
own illegal conduct to wrongfully obtain evidence against a 
criminal suspect. Despite the State's arguments to the contrary, 
this fundamental legal document still holds. Any consent obtained 
by Officer Bushnell from Defendant in this action for a search of 
the vehicle that Defendant was driving was hopelessly tainted by 
his own illegal conduct. There were no intervening factors between 
that illegal conduct and the obtaining of the consent. Therefore, 
the evidence at issue must be suppressed. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON REMAND IN NOT ADDRESSING THE ISSUE 
FOR WHICH THIS CASE WAS REMANDED. 
When this matter was previously remanded by this Court to the 
Trial Court, the Court, in the conclusion of its Memorandum 
Decision simply stated: 
In view of the State's concessions, the decision of the 
trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for a 
determination as to whether the consent to search was 
valid under Thurman. (Memorandum Decision p.3). 
Prior to its conclusion, however, the Court also stated: 
In view of the State's concession that the consent was 
obtained only after an illegal police activity, the 
court's finding of consent is now incomplete. The trial 
court, on remand, must address "'whether the consent was 
obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality' 
. . . or, in other words, 'whether the 'taint' of the 
Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to 
permit introduction of the evidence.'" Memorandum 
Decision Pg. 2. 
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Judge Ballif, the Judge who made the original ruling which was 
reversed, retired before the remand. Therefore, remand was to 
Judge Ballif's successor, Hon. Lynn W. Davis. Right from the 
beginning it was clear that Judge Davis did not understand why the 
case was remanded. He said so directly near the beginning of his 
ruling, a ruling that reached the same conclusion (although by a 
different route) as the original ruling of Judge Ballif. Judge 
Davis started out his discussion with the comment: 
This court wonders why the Utah Court of Appeals remanded 
this case. Admittedly, the questions of whether a 
defendant's consent was given voluntarily and whether 
this consent was obtained by police exploitation of the 
prior illegality, are factual questions. But certainly 
there appears in the records sufficient findings before 
the court in order to apply the Thurman analysis without 
the necessity of remand. Defendant argues that the Court 
of Appeals remanded the case in order for the trial court 
to dismiss the case. That position is not well taken. 
The Utah Court of Appeals could have suppressed the 
evidence and/or dismissed the case, if it desired. Was 
it remanded in order to take additional evidence on the 
issue and have the trial court make the Thurman analysis? 
The Thurman analysis is a legal analysis and the facts 
have already been established. The reason for the remand 
is somewhat confusing to this court. (R. 332-3). 
Near the end of the trial court's opinion, Judge Davis stated: 
This court fully recognizes that its principal focus on 
the "purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct" 
may result in an additional remand to further examine the 
"temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent" 
factor as well as "the presence of intervening 
circumstance" factor. (R. 339). 
In short, the trial court wandered off down a primrose path 
which was suggested to it by the State. That path was started upon 
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because of an admitted confusion of the trial court as to why the 
case was back there in the first place, and what re-examination 
should be made. In the end, the trial court admitted that it had 
not answered the question proposed to it by the Court of Appeals, 
and admitted that it may well have to consider the case again on a 
further remand. The trial court was asked to do a job that it 
chose not to do. Because of that failure and refusal, the court 
should find error from beginning to end in the trial court's new 
ruling, and should once again reverse. This time, however, the 
court should not remand for any further decisions by the trial 
court. The trial court itself stated, correctly, that there were 
plenty of facts in the record that first went up to this Court upon 
which to base a suppression. Those facts are still there. They 
have not been added to or changed in any meaningful way. Appellant 
implores this court make its ruling final, complete and 
unequivocal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE 
ON REMAND IS THE FLAGRANCY OF THE OFFICERS CONDUCT. 
As set forth above, this court in remanding to the District 
Court, asked the District Court to determine whether the admitted 
Fourth Amendment detention violation committed by Officer Bushnell 
was "sufficiently attenuated" from that illegal conduct to permit 
introduction of the evidence in court. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
10 
State v, Arroyof 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) discussed at some length 
the question of whether a consent to a search obtained after 
illegal conduct by a police officer, is nevertheless valid. The 
tests set forth by the Supreme Court in that case were as follows: 
Two factors determine whether consent to a search is 
lawfully obtained following initial police misconduct. 
The inquiries should focus on whether the consent was 
voluntary and whether consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality. Evidence obtained 
in searches following police illegality must meet both 
tests to be admissible. 796 P.2d at 688. 
In discussing the exploitation of the prior misconduct, the 
Utah Supreme Court went on to say: 
The basis for the second part of the two-part analysis is 
found in the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 
9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), which stated that a trial court 
must determine in such a case n/Whether granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to 
which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.'" 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417 (quoting 
MaGuire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)). The "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" doctrine has been extended to 
invalidate consents which, despite being voluntary, are 
nonetheless the exploitation of a prior police 
illegality. 796 P. 2d at 690. [See also State v. Godina-
Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992).] 
Under the reasoning of Arroyo, the State would clearly not 
prevail under the facts of this case. The State has, however, 
pointed out most strongly a more recent Utah Supreme Court case 
which, according to the State, modifies the test substantially in 
its favor. That case, State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 
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is contended to be a major shift in direction by the Utah Supreme 
Court. To date, this Court has not bought that argument, and as 
will be discussed more fully below, there is no reason to do so. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the Thurman case, did not suggest an 
overruling of its earlier decision in Arroyo. The state must still 
prove that the consent was "not obtained by police exploitation of 
the prior illegality". The Supreme Court, in confirming that, 
said: 
In sum, to find that a defendant's consent following 
police illegality is valid under the Fourth Amendment, 
the prosecution must prove (i) that the defendant's 
consent was given voluntarily, i.e. , that the consent was 
the product of his or her own free will; and (ii) that 
the consent was not obtained by exploitation of the prior 
illegality, i.e., that the connection between the consent 
and the prior illegality was sufficiently attenuated that 
excluding the evidence would have no deterrent effect. 
846 P.2d at 1265. 
Once again, this language from the Utah Supreme Court is 
detrimental to the position of the State. The State has therefore 
ignored that portion of the Thurman case, and has, somewhat 
amazingly, convinced Judge Davis to do the same. The State, 
instead of looking at attenuation, as this court has looked, has 
suggested that the Thurman case has effectively overruled much of 
Utah case law on the question of suppression, and has gone off in 
a new direction. The Thurman court did engage in a lengthy 
discussion of the reason behind the exclusionary rule in Fourth 
Amendment cases. The Supreme Court stated: 
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Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police from 
engaging in illegal conduct even though that conduct may 
be followed by a voluntary consent to the subsequent 
search. 846 P.2d at 1263. 
The Thurman court went on to discuss the efforts to deter 
further illegal police conduct, and in so doing, discussed how 
substantial the illegal conduct may have been on the part of the 
officer. Discussing the severity of the illegal conduct, the court 
stated: 
Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean 
break in the chain of events between the misconduct and 
the consent to find the consent valid . . . . The same 
type of break should be required where the evidence shows 
that the police purposely engaged in conduct to induce a 
consent. Conversely, where it appears that the 
illegality that arose is the result of negligence, the 
lapse of time between the misconduct and the consent and 
the presence of intervening events become less critical 
to the dissipation of the taint. 846 P.2d at 1264. 
The State has suggested here the misconduct of the police 
officer in illegally detaining this Defendant, was a "technical" 
violation. The court below bought that argument fully, and said: 
This court concludes that since there were no clear court 
pronouncements as of July 20, 1991, regarding these type 
of questions asked by this officer, his improper 
questioning was only a "technical" violation. (R. 340). 
Upon remand, and over the objection of Defendant, Officer 
Bushnell was once again put on the witness stand and allowed to 
testify that he did not understand, at the time of the stop in 
question, what the rules were regarding detention of a suspect in 
which the original reason for stopping him had been dissipated. 
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The trial court carefully entered findings supporting that 
contention: 
1. At the time of the stop, July 20, 1991, there was no 
written or verbal policy of the Utah Highway Patrol, or 
the officer7s department, proscribing an inquiry of a 
driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs 
or narcotics in the vehicle. 
2. Departmental policy allowed Officer Bushnell to ask 
personal questions at the time of the stop; the questions 
were not scripted. 
3. The questions posed to the driver of this vehicle 
were those routinely asked in his law enforcement 
practice. This driver was not singled out for any 
reason. 
4. Officer Bushnell adjusts his law enforcement 
practices based up [sic] training, advice from the county 
attorney, based upon Utah Highway Patrol directives and 
based upon court decisions. 
5. He was not aware through these educational and 
training efforts as of July 20, 1991, that any law, 
statute, court case prohibited or called into question 
his inquiry regarding contraband in a vehicle or a 
request to search. As of July 20, 1991, he acted in 
conformity with his training and legal advice. 
6. Lastly, and most importantly, it is stressed that 
Officer Bushnell has abandoned this procedure in light of 
court decisions handed down since July 20, 1991. State 
v. Godina-Luna 826 P. 2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). No one 
would suggest that law enforcement officers should be 
clairvoyant enough to divine future appellate decisions. 
(R. 339). 
It should be noted that the trial court put great faith in the 
statements of the officer that he "innocently" broke the law and 
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution on 
July 20, 1991. "Most importantly", however, is the fact that 
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Officer Bushnell told the Judge that he does not do that anymore, 
and promised to behave in the future. The trial court, therefore, 
found that this officer was already rehabilitated and did not have 
to be sanctioned in order to get him to stop his illegal conduct. 
The court in its ruling stated " . . . this court has principally 
focused on 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct' 
factor because of the unique facts established at the supplemental 
evidentiary hearing" (R. 339). There is nothing unique at all 
about the facts established, to the satisfaction of the court, on 
remand. The officer, after proper coaching, simply went in and 
took a properly repentant attitude before the Judge. Criminal 
Defendants are rarely given an opportunity to repent in the same 
manner and avoid prosecutions simply because they promise to behave 
in the future. It is interesting to note that those who seek to 
widen police powers always seek to minimize their own illegal 
conduct as a "technicality". A violation of the Constitution of 
the United States is not a "technicality". The police officer has 
violated the law just as surely as the Defendant may have done. 
The United States Supreme Court, in an effort to stop the police 
from continuing to do that, devised the exclusionary rule, thus 
ensuring that illegal conduct on the part of the police will have 
its consequences. Under the reasoning suggested by the trial 
court, the police officer is encouraged to resolve any doubt in 
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favor of aggressive conduct, and then to say, "well, I wasn't sure, 
so I guessed, and I sure am sorry that I guessed wrong"• This is 
not the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and that is not what the 
Thurman court attempted to convey. 
Likewise, the authority cited by Appellant to challenge the 
continued detention and the investigation of the alleged illegal 
behavior, was not new at the time of the stop. In Utah the major 
authority for the proposition that the type of investigation 
undertaken by Officer Bushnell was not legal is the case of State 
v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990). The later case of 
State v. Godina-Luna is based extensively on the Robinson case; and 
the latter case does not break new ground. In Robinson, as is now 
true here, there was no issue as to whether the initial stop of 
Defendant was illegal. As in this case, in Robinson, the initial 
reason for the stop was taken care of quickly, when a warning 
citation was issued. The Defendant in Robinson was held further, 
however, because of a lack of eye contact and nervous conduct. As 
in the instant case, the officers in Robinson checked to see if the 
vehicle had been reported stolen. In neither case, were there such 
reports. The Robinson court stated: 
Even considering all the circumstances facing the 
troopers, the fact the defendants could not — during 
the brief time span of the valid traffic stop 
produce either written authorization from the owner or a 
successful telephone contact with the owner is 
insufficient to provide the officers with reasonable 
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suspicion of car theft or other serious crime sufficient 
to justify the road-side detention and questioning that 
followed. 
In sum, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in 
its finding that the troopers had the reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their 
continued detention and questioning of Robinson and 
Towers once the warning citation was given and the 
purposes for the initial stop had been accomplished. 
Defendants7 detention after that point was, therefore, a 
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. 797 P.2d at 
436-7. 
The Robinson case was decided one full year prior to the stop at 
issue here. The statement by this court, telling Officer Bushnell 
(and others) that he could not continue to hold and question a 
motorist in a situation such as this, seems to be as clear as it 
can be. How much more clear either Officer Bushnell or Judge Davis 
would have wanted it, is what is not clear. Despite Judge Davis7 
finding to the contrary, Officer Bushnell did not modify his 
behavior after this Court ruled that such behavior was illegal. He 
continued it for at least a full year. Officer Bushnell knew, or 
should have known, of the rules set forth by the Robinson court in 
dealing with the type of situation that he confronted in this 
matter. He could not have had a good faith belief that his wild 
search for something to explain the "guilty" behavior of Defendant 
was justified. The later decisions by this Court that have 
continued to strike down this kind of police behavior should have 
come as no surprise to Officer Bushnell or to the Attorney General 
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of the State of Utah. The officer's behavior at the time of the 
detention and the search was all one tightly connected stream of 
behavior. There is no way that the Thurman case can be used by the 
officer to wriggle out of what he should have known at the time he 
stopped Defendant: that he could not detain a Defendant without 
articulable suspicion of particular criminal behavior. The Supreme 
Court continues to require a break between the illegal behavior and 
a search that comes out of it. There is no such break; and any 
consent given by Defendant to the search made by Officer Bushnell 
is hopelessly tainted. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT VIOLATION AND THE CONSENT TO SEARCH. 
In this matter, we have an admitted Fourth Amendment 
violation. The State admitted that when this matter was before 
this court before. That admission was part of the basis for this 
Court's reversal of the original trial court decision refusing to 
suppress the evidence. It is true that the Utah Supreme Court, in 
Thurman. stated that less severe acts of misconduct on the part of 
a police officer will require less attenuation than more extreme 
conduct. Nevertheless, the Thurman court did not disturb the 
requirement "that the consent was not obtained by exploitation of 
the prior illegality". 
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To date, the State has not given any plausible argument to 
suggest that the consent to search obtained by Officer Bushnell was 
"sufficiently attenuated" from the illegal conduct in holding 
Defendant for further investigation. In fact, the record is clear 
that everything that the officer did was directed towards one 
purpose: To find out why Defendant was acting "guilty" and to 
catch him doing something illegal. The officer was convinced, from 
the moment he pulled up alongside Defendant's automobile, that 
Defendant was "guilty" and he made no apology for that decision in 
the suppression hearing. He made no apology for the fact that all 
of his conduct from that moment on was designed to catch the 
"guilty" person and to see that he was punished for his crime, 
whatever crime it might turn out to be. Defendant was stopped for 
that purpose, he was held for that purpose, he was questioned for 
that purpose, and a search was commenced for that purpose. 
The facts set forth in the Thurman case show some rather 
outrageous behavior on the part of the police officers involved in 
that search. Nevertheless, the Court found that there was a 
substantial "attenuation" between that outrageous conduct and the 
consent to the search, which was obtained several hours later. The 
Utah Supreme Court made that decision because the actual consent to 
search that was at issue was made in writing, was made after 
repeated "Miranda warnings" and was made well after the improper 
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police conduct. Additionally, the consent made by Mr. Thurman was 
to the search of a storage unit which was completely separate from 
the scene where the original police misconduct had occurred. In 
fact, the police did not appear to have any knowledge of the 
existence of the storage unit to which they later obtained consent 
to search. Not only did Mr. Thurman consent to the search of the 
storage unit, it is apparently he who brought the existence of the 
storage unit to the attention of the police; and he did it after he 
was warned by the police that he did not have to answer any 
questions without an attorney present. None of those attenuating 
circumstances existed in the case of Mr. Ziegleman. Mr Ziegleman 
was being held against his will while Office Bushnell frantically 
searched for evidence of some kind of crime. Unlike Mr. Thurman, 
no search warrant was issued at any time by any magistrate 
whatsoever; and that additional check on the raw power of the 
police did not exist. 
Since the Thurman case was decided in January, 1993, the State 
has asked this Court to ignore total, or almost total, lack of 
attenuation in several instances. This Court has never allowed 
that to succeed. In State v. Shoulderblade, 258 P.2d 1049 (Utah 
App. 1993) cert, granted, 858 P.2d 1049 (Utah 1994), this Court 
said: 
"The same facts exist here as in Small, which indicate a 
very short period of time lapse between the stop of the 
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vehicle at the roadblock and the officer's request to 
search the vehicle, and no intervening factors existing 
since the consent was obtained during the ongoing 
roadblock. Accordingly, the "consent to have the vehicle 
searched was not sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the 
taint of the illegal roadblock." 858 P.2d 1052-3. 
In State v. Hubbard, 861 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1993), the court 
found that the stop itself was illegal. Referring to the issue 
here, the Court stated: 
"We do not address the remaining contentions, including 
the State's arguments regarding attenuation, because we 
find such contentions to be without merit." 861 P.2d at 
1055. 
In the case of State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1994) 
Cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359, (Utah 1994) This court once again 
found insufficient grounds for stopping the Defendant. The Court 
went on to say: 
"Despite the illegal stop, it is constitutionally 
permissible to admit the evidence recovered as a result 
of the search of Bello's vehicle if both prongs of a two-
part test are satisfied: (1) the consent was voluntarily 
given, and (2) the consent was not obtained through 
"exploitation" of the prior illegal police conduct. 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). 871 P.2d 
at 587. 
This Court referred to Thurman, and set forth the factors 
to be reviewed under that case: 
There are three factors to consider in determining 
whether the consent in this case was sufficiently 
attenuated: (1) the "purpose and flagrancy" of the stop, 
(2) the amount of time that had elapsed between the stop 
and the consent, and (3) the presence or absence of 
"intervening circumstances." 871 P.2d at 588. 
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The Court discussed the first prong or factor thusly: 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained the "purpose and 
flagrancy" factor as directly bearing upon the "deterrent 
value" of suppression. Thurmanf 846 P.2d 1263. Specifi-
cally, "if the misconduct is flagrantly abusive, there is 
a greater likelihood that the police engaged in the 
conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives, and 
suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater 
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the 
future." Id. 1264. While the police misconduct in this 
case is conduct that should be discouraged, it does not 
fall into the category of flagrant abuse. We conclude, 
after balancing the value of deterring what virtually 
amounts to a random stop against the lack of a flagrant 
abuse or improper motivation, that this factor is 
neutral. Id. 
This Court next discussed the question of time: 
With respect to the temporal proximity factor, the record 
establishes that very little time passed between the 
initial stop and the request for permission to search the 
vehicle. Barney asked a few questions about the reason 
for the weaving, the identity of the vehicle's owner, and 
Bello's destination, along with requesting his license 
and registration. A few minutes later, after checking 
the information provided by Bello, Barney returned and 
asked if he could look in the vehicle. As in State v. 
Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), Cert, granted, 853 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), a case with facts quite similar to 
the instant case, "ft]he consent was obtained within 
minutes of the illegal stop, and not even under [a] clear 
error standard of review could the trial court find 
enough time between the stop and the grant of consent to 
attenuate the relationship between the two." Id. 151; 
see also State v. Godina Lunaf 826 P. 2d 652, 656 (Utah 
App. 1992)("The consent occurred during an ongoing 
illegal seizure, thus no time factor separated the 
illegality from the consent."). Therefore, the second 
factor weighs in favor of suppressing the evidence. Id. 
This Court then discussed the final factor and said: 
The final factor in the exploitation analysis, whether 
there are intervening circumstances, also supports a 
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conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed. The 
intervening circumstances must be independent of the 
illegal conduct. Sims, 808 P.2d at 151. Therefore, the 
fact that Barney smelled marijuana when he approached the 
car is not an intervening circumstance because the 
opportunity to smell the marijuana arose directly from 
the illegal stop. See Id. There are no facts in the 
record indicating that there were any other independent 
intervening circumstances, and accordingly, there was no 
opportunity for the taint from the illegal stop to 
dissipate through these means. 871 P.2d 588-9. 
In the case of State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994) 
this Court reversed a ruling of a district court denying 
suppression of evidence after an illegal entry to a home. While 
not directly of precedent value in this instance, it is interesting 
to note that the dissent of Judge Bench seemed to mirror the 
state's arguments in this case, when he said: 
"Because the police misconduct in this case did not 
"implicate a fundamental violation of Defendant's 
rights," I would affirm the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's motion to suppress. 876 P.2d at 403. 
The State continues to argue that their violation of the law 
does not constitute a "fundamental violation" of constitutional 
rights. In the above-referenced case, they did convince one Judge. 
The instant case suggests no credible reason why any Judge should 
be convinced. This Court recently addressed the question of 
investigatory automobile stops again, in the DUI case of State v. 
Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994). The Court there found the 
initial stop to be unlawful. The Court, in conclusion stated: 
"Consequently, the investigating officer's stop of 
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defendant's vehicle, although made in good faith reliance 
on radioed information, was not lawful• We reverse the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
all evidence flowing from this seizure and remand for 
such proceedings as may now be appropriate." 884 P.2d at 
1274. 
No final decision was made by this Court regarding the 
suppression of the evidence. Nevertheless, the fact that the stop 
was illegal once again resulted in a reversal of the denial of the 
Motion to Suppress. This Court has continued to tell the law 
enforcement officers of this State that illegal conduct on their 
part will result in reaction by this Court. In no single case has 
this Court found unlawful conduct on the part of the police 
officers to be so inconsequential that no action was taken. Yet, 
the State continues to argue their violation of the law is not 
important. Once again, this Court needs to remind them that that 
is not so. 
Shortly prior to the decision in Thurman, the Utah Supreme 
Court decided the case of Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 841 
P. 2d 6 (Utah 1992). In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
search made at an illegal police road block, even though the police 
had obtained a consent to search at that road block. The Supreme 
Court therein extended the exclusionary rule to proceedings brought 
in front of the Utah State Commission for failure to affix drug-tax 
stamps. The rule appeared clear, after Sims that the search of a 
vehicle after an illegal stop and an illegal detention is itself 
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illegal, unless there are unusual circumstances which satisfy the 
strong burden of proof on the State to show that the consent was 
given separately from the stop and the detention. 
After Thurman, the Utah Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
revisit the Sims case in the companion case of State v. Sims 881 
P.2d 840 (Utah 1994). The State successfully argued that the 
attenuation issue should be revisited in Sims, to the point that 
the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to this court for 
further review. The criminal appeal raising the same issues raised 
in the earlier tax commission casef was the perfect opportunity for 
the Utah Supreme Court to overturn its previous rulings, and to 
restrict the exclusion of evidence seized illegally. Instead, the 
Utah Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted, having decided that the issues in Sims were 
res judicata. The State would minimize the significance of this 
case, and deny any precedential value. The significance of State 
v. Sims, however, is that, in order to read Thurman as the State 
would read it, one would have to imply an overruling of Sims v. 
Utah State Tax Commission. Apparently, the Utah Supreme Court does 
not read it that way, and has therefore not overruled its first 
decision in Sims. 
The same issues presented here were recently before the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 
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(10th Cir. 1994). The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah had previously upheld a search which netted a 
quantity of crack cocaine. The Tenth Circuit Court found that, in 
a case quite reminiscent of the instant one, continued detention is 
unlawful, after the original reason for the stop had been 
satisfied. In that instance, a Utah highway patrol trooper 
questioned the validity of a temporary registration sticker. Upon 
closer examination, after a stop, it was determined that the 
sticker was valid. Nevertheless, the trooper went on to ask for 
identification and vehicle registration. A continued discussion 
resulted in the driver indicating that he did not have a valid 
driver's license. The trooper ran a criminal history check, found 
a record of a previous conviction, and became more suspicious. The 
following then occurred between the officer and Mr. McSwain: 
He then asked if they were "packing" any alcohol, 
firearms or drugs in the vehicle. After Mr. McSwain 
answered in the negative, Trooper Avery asked, "do you 
mind if I look?" Mr. McSwain responded, "go ahead." 
Trooper Avery said, "why don't you step out a sec?" He 
then explained that, because Mr. McSwain's license had 
been suspended Mr. Fisher would have to drive. Trooper 
Avery searched the interior of the car, conversing with 
Mr. McSwain and Mr. Fisher throughout the search. 
Trooper Avery specifically asked and received Mr. 
Fisher's permission to look inside a brief case lying in 
the back seat. He then retrieved the keys from the 
ignition and approached the rear of the vehicle. He 
asked Mr. McSwain and Mr. Fisher if there were just 
clothes in the trunk and they said, "yes." After 
examining several items in the trunk, Trooper Avery found 
a green duffle bag. He asked who it belonged to, and Mr. 
McSwain said it belonged to him. Trooper Avery opened 
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the duffle bag and discovered a set of scales, a gun and 
a plastic bag containing a substance which appeared to be 
crack cocaine. 29 F.3d at 560. 
The Court, after finding that the detention was unlawful next 
discussed the search: 
A question remains as to whether Mr. McSwain/s consent to 
the search of his vehicle cleansed the taint of the 
unlawful detention, thereby validating the search. "A 
search proceeded by a Fourth Amendment violation remains 
valid if the consent to search was voluntary in fact 
under the totality of the circumstances." The government 
must demonstrate that Mr. McSwain's consent to search is 
"sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary 
taint of the illegal [detention]." (Citations omitted) 
29 F.3d at 562. 
In looking at the consent, the Tenth Circuit noted that the 
request and consent to search were an integral part of the 
continuing illegal detention: 
... Trooper Avery failed to specifically inform Mr. 
McSwain that he was free to leave the scene or that he 
could refuse to give his consent. These are "important 
factors in our consideration." Fernandez, 18 F.3d 882; 
see also Id. ("Although informing a defendant of his 
right to refuse consent is not a prerequisite to 
establishing voluntary consent, we consider it a factor 
particularly worth noting.") 29 F.3d at 563 
Appellant acknowledges that, in State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 403 
(Utah App. 1994), this Court declined to rule that Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution specifically requires "informed 
consent" to avoid a suppression of evidence. But, as with the 
Tenth Circuit, the lack of such consent is a "factor particularly 
worth noting". 
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The Court then went on to discuss the same three factors this 
Court has used above
 r referring to them as "Brown Factors", 
referring to Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 
L.Ed. 2d 416 (U.S. 1975). The Court stated: 
We next consider the three "Brown Factors." The first 
two factors weigh heavily against finding the taint 
cleansed. Mr. McSwain consented to the search only a few 
minutes after being illegally detained and questioned by 
Trooper Avery. Also, there were absolutely no 
intervening circumstances in the short period of time 
between the illegal detention and Mr. McSwain7s consent. 
These factors both indicate that there was "no break in 
the causal connection between the illegality and the 
evidence thereby obtained." (Citations omitted) 29 F.3d 
at 563. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals firmly put to rest the 
government's suggestion that the trooper's conduct was not 
flagrant, and did not require remedial action by the Court. The 
Court discussed the flagrancy rather thoroughly, and found that 
this was the type of conduct for which the remedy of suppression 
was fashioned. That incident was remarkably similar to the instant 
case. Therefore, that discussion is set out in full below: 
Finally, the third Brown factor — the purpose and 
flagrancy of Trooper Avery's conduct — weighs against 
finding the taint purged. Trooper Avery testified that 
he detained Mr. McSwain only because he routinely 
requests a driver's license and registration upon 
stopping a vehicle to ensure that the driver is licensed 
and is the owner of the vehicle. The record, however, 
suggests that Trooper Avery's aims in this case were not 
so narrow. Before he even requested identification and 
vehicle registration, Trooper Avery inquired whether Mr. 
McSwain had just bought the vehicle and whether he was 
just taking a test drive. Requesting identification and 
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vehicle registration, Trooper Avery then quizzed the 
vehicle's occupants about their travel itinerary. Later, 
upon returning their documentation, he asked what they 
were doing in Denver and if that was where they lived. 
This unnecessary questioning, viewed in its factual 
context, suggests that Trooper Avery detained Mr. 
McSwain's vehicle with a "quality of purposefulness," 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, embarking upon 
a fishing expedition "in the hope that something might 
turn up," id. Cf. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 833 (finding 
"quality of purposefulness" because officer detained 
driver based "solely on a tension in the air and his 
vague hunch that something was afoot, with the hope that 
something might turn up") (internal quotations omitted); 
Peters, 10 F. 3d at 1523 (finding flagrant misconduct 
where agent stopped a vehicle "solely on an unsupported, 
inarticulable 'hunch'" supplied by another officer who 
previously had stopped and searched the vehicle and found 
no evidence of drugs or illegal activity). Considering 
the totality of the circumstances and giving special 
emphasis to the three Brown factors, we conclude that Mr. 
McSwain's consent was not "sufficiently an act of free 
will to purge the primary taint of the illegal 
[detention]." Maez . 872 F.2d at 1453. *- *<"-4. 
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the law as set forth in the Robinson case, and was engaged in with 
the same "quality of purposefulness" as that in McSwain. Maybe 
Officer Bushnell will not do it again. The Defendant suggests that 
the officer will be sorely tempted to do so if he finds that his 
conduct bears no consequences. 
The State has tried to convince this Court that it has, in the 
past, gone too far in suppressing evidence, and has gone beyond 
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution. This 
recent case is a firm statement that this is not true. The United 
States Constitution does protect Mr. Ziegleman from the kind of 
conduct admitted here by Officer Bushnell. The Constitution 
requires the same result here as in McSwain, that the evidence be 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Brent Ziegleman was illegally held or "seized" by 
Officer Bushnell on July 20, 1991, pending an illegal 
investigation. Any search was a "fruit of the poison tree" 
resulting from the illegal detention. Because the evidence to be 
used against this Defendant by the State was seized as a result of 
unlawful proceedings by the Utah Highway Patrol, use of that 
evidence must be suppressed; and the ruling of the court below 
denying the suppression should be reversed. 
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January 14, 1992, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, Trooper 
Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, 
observed a motor vehicle in the area of Nephi, and visually 
estimated the speed to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75 
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on the vehicle. 
The officer had received training and certification in estimating 
of speeds. 
2. The officer turned and followed the vehicle to obtain a 
paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed and was now traveling 60 
m.p.h.. He then pulled alongside the vehicle with the intent of 
giving the driver a hand signal to slow down. Neither the driver 
nor the passenger would look towards him so he could signal them 
to slow down. The officer then stopped the vehicle with the intent 
of giving the driver a warning concerning his speeding. 
3. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Brent Lee 
Ziegleman, with one other passenger in the vehicle, the defendant, 
Michael McNaughton. 
4. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the 
driver and asked for a driver's license and registration. The 
driver produced a driverfs license, but was unable to produce a 
registration. The driver claimed the owner's name was "Bill" and 
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with the intent to distribute. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The stop of the defendants1 vehicle by Trooper Bushnell 
for speeding based upon his visual estimate was lawful based upon 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law. 
2. The continued detention of the defendants after the 
initial stop for speeding, was justified based upon the defendants 
inability to produce a registration for the vehicle or any 
authority to be in possession of the vehicle. 
3. The defendant, Ziegleman, voluntarily consented to a 
search of the vehicle by the officer without any coercion or duress 
by the officer. 
4. Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore did not have 
standing to object to a search of that area of the vehicle. 
5. Both defendants1 Motions to Suppress should be denied. 
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tria 
• in . eiiocutory appeal, defendant challenges the 
denial of his motion to suppress evi dence. 
ii." . . -= . :u« •_
 xi) defendant was legally stopped 
for speeding; (2) con- mention after the stop was 
J
 ified; and defendant voluntarily consented to a search, of 
LUK vehicle. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that (•) 
defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the venice. 
ippeal, defendant challenges all four of these rulings. 
1 The Stop 
The trial court found the stop 
officer's reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law. The 
officer testified that he stopped defendant to issue him a 
warning citation, after having visually estimated the speed 
defendant's vehicle to be 75 m.p.h. Since there is evidence to 
support the trial court's finding, we i lphold the validity :" the 
strop. 
2. Continued Detention 
After having verified that the vehicle had not been reported 
stolen, the officer asked defendant whether there were any 
weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. On appeal, the State 
concedes that this question exceeded the scope of detention for a 
routine traffic stop and that the question was unrelated to the 
issue of whether the vehicle was stolen. The State therefore 
concedes "that the continued detention of defendant violated the 
fourth amendment." Because of this concession, we reverse the 
trial court's determination that continued detention was 
justified. 
3. Consent 
In view of the State's concession that the consent was 
obtained only after an illegal police activity, the court's 
finding of consent is now incomplete. The trial court, on 
remand, must address "'whether the consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality' . . . or, in other words, 
'whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment violation was 
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.'11 
See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
4. Standing 
The State also concedes that defendant has standing to 
challenge the search of the vehicle. Because of this concession, 
we reverse the trial court's alternative holding that defendant 
lacked standing. 
CONCLUSION 
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trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for a 
determination as to whether the consent to search v/as valid under 
Thurman 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
BRENT LEE ZIEGELMAN 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion Suppress 
CASE NO. 82E 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
Judge George E. Ballif, now retired, denied defendant's motion to suppress in a 
ruling dated January 14, 1992. That ruling was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. In a 
Memorandum Decision dated September 9,1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
decision of the trial court based upon several concessions by the State of Utah. The Court of 
Appeals remanded the case for determination as to whether the consent to search was valid 
under Thurman. The Remittitur was filed with the Clerk of the District Court on October 18, 
1993. 
On November 29, 1993, a conference call was conducted by the court. The 
purpose was for the court to determine if the parties wished a further evidentiary hearing or 
whether they wished the court to make the Thurman analysis from the record of the 
suppression hearing conducted on November 15, 1991, before Judge Ballif. The parties did 
not want to foreclose any options, so the court requested briefing and scheduled a hearing 
date to take evidence and to entertain legal argument. Counsel for defendant filed a 
"Request for Further Evidentiary Hearing and Demand for Speedy Trial" on November 19, 
1993. 
A hearing was scheduled on January 28, 1994. The State of Utah submitted 
extensive briefing on January 3, 1994. Defendant relied upon his original Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in support of the Motion to Suppress Evidence which was filed on 
October 15, 1991. 
Subsequent to the hearing, defendant filed a Supplementary Memorandum on March 
31, 1994. The State then filed "State's Response to Defendant's Supplemental 
Memorandum" about April 4, 1994. During the pendency of this case, counsel have alerted 
the court of the status of various cases now pending before Utah's appellate courts. The 
court, having entertained the arguments of counsel, reviewed the various memoranda, and 
otherwise being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following: 
Ruling 
I. 
Issue 
The sole issue before the court is whether the consent to search in this traffic stop 
was valid under a Thurman analysis. * Because Judge Ballif found no prior illegality, he did 
not address the validity of defendant's consent under the second prong of the Arroyo -
Thurman test. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded this case for the sole purpose of 
having this court evaluate: 
"Whether the consent was obtained by police expectation of the prior illegality...or, 
in other words, whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment valuation was 
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence." State v. Ziegleman, 
unpublished memorandum decision dated September 9, 1993, at 2 
This court wonders why the Utah Court of Appeals remanded this case. 
Admittedly, the questions of whether a defendant's consent was given voluntarily and 
whether this consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality, are factual 
questions. But certainly there appears in the record sufficient findings before the court in 
order to apply the Thurman analysis without the necessity of remand. Defendant argues that 
the Court of Appeals remanded the case in order for the trial court to dismiss the case. That 
position is not well taken. The Utah Court of Appeals could have suppressed the evidence 
and/or dismissed the case, if it desired. Was it remanded in order to take additional evidence 
on the consent issue and have the trial court make the Thurman analysis? The Thurman 
analysis is a legal analysis and the facts have already been established. The reason for the 
remand is somewhat confusing to this court. Nevertheless, the court scheduled a 
supplementary evidentiary hearing. This court has no intention of disturbing the facts as 
previously determined by Judge George Ballif at the suppression hearing conducted by him. 
n 
Facts 
The facts as established by Judge Ballif at the suppression hearing are not in dispute 
as to the consent issue. This court conducted the supplementary hearing. 
This court, therefore, specifically adopts the Findings of Fact of Judge Ballif dated 
March 24, 1992, consisting of paragraphs 1-8. In addition, this court specifically finds the 
following from the supplemental evidentiary hearing: 
1. Officer Lance Bushnell stated that as of the date of the stop, July 20, 1991, 
there was no written or verbal policy of his department, the Utah Highway patrol, 
proscribing an inquiry of a driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs or 
narcotics in the vehicle. 
2. Officer Bushnell testified that department policy allowed him to ask personal 
questions at a stop; the questions are not scripted. 
3. Officer Bushnell testified that it was his practice to routinely ask whether there 
was any contraband in stopped vehicles. Ziegleman and McNaughton were not singled out 
for any reason. 
4. Officer Bushnell further testified that his law enforcement practices are guided 
by P.O.S.T. training, by legal advice from the county attorney, from reading court decisions, 
and from departmental directive. 
5. Officer Bushnell testified that at the time of the stop, he was not aware of any 
law, statute, or court case which would have prohibited, or called into question, his inquiry 
regarding contraband and a request to search. 
6. He further testified that he, therefore, proceeded under the law at the time and 
that his procedure and behavior were proper and that he acted in conformity with the legal 
advise he had been given. 
7. Lastly, he testified that he has now abandoned this procedure in light of new 
case law decisions handed down since this stop and upon advice of counsel. 
m 
Discussion 
For the most part, the State's analysis of State v. Arroyo , 796 P.2d 684 (1990), 
and State v. Thurman , 846 P.2d 1256 (1193), is accurate. Determining whether a 
defendant's consent to a search following illegal police action is valid under the Fourth 
Amendment, requires inquiry into (1) whether the consent was given voluntary, and (2) 
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. Thurman at 
1262. 
A 
The First Prong Voluntariness of the Consent 
After the officer asked the driver if there were any weapons, drugs or narcotics in 
the vehicle, the driver said there were not any. The officer then asked for consent to 
search. Mr. Ziegleman unhesitantly replied "help yourself." (See findings of Judge Ballif, 
No 6.) 
The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and found nothing of substance. 
The officer then asked for consent to search the trunk, which consent was again given by 
the driver. Again no contraband was found. Officer Bushnell then searched the hood area 
where the cocaine was discovered. (See findings of Judge Ballif, No 6) This court 
emphasizes that consent was sought and granted in two instances as the level of intrusion and 
search increased. The response in each instance was affirmative. 
The State argues that the first prong is met because the defendant "never alleged 
that his consent was not given voluntarily." State's Memorandum at 10. However, H(t)he 
prosecution bears the burden of proving that the defendant's consent was voluntary." 
Thurman at 1263 (citations omitted). The only proof offered by the State is that "Trooper 
Bushnell's uncontroverted testimony was that defendant in fact consented to the search." 
State's Memorandum at 11 (citing Sepulveda). 
Despite the State's assertion that H(t)he first prong... is not at issue," IJL* "whether 
the requisite voluntariness exists depends on the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-
both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." Thurman at 1262-
63 (citations omitted). Whether the defendant's consent was actually a product of his or her 
free will is a factual question. "The analysis used to determine voluntariness is the same 
without regard to whether the consent was obtained after illegal police conduct." LdL. at 
1262. In the case at hand, this issue is not as clear cut as the state asserts. 
The burden never shifts to the defendant to show that the consent was involuntary. 
The burden always rests with the state to show that the consent was voluntary. The state 
argues that the defendant has never alleged that his consent was involuntary. But Thurman 
holds that the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the consent was given voluntarily. 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993). Given the state's burden of proof on 
this issue, it may be inappropriate for the state to require the defendant to allege involuntary 
consent; rather whether the consent was given voluntarily must be part of the state's 
affirmative burden of proof. 
This court, after consideration of the totality of the circumstances, concludes that 
the consent to search was freely and unequivocally given. The court relies upon the 
following in reaching that conclusion: 
1. Officer Lance Bushnell was the only witness called by the State and his 
testimony was undisputed; 
2. Defendant did not choose to attend the supplemental hearing to dispute the 
officer's version; 
3. The initial consent was given unhesitatingly; the defendant did not delay in his 
response nor did he equivocate; 
4. This court considers a "help yourself response to Officer Bushnell's inquiry to 
be unequivocal,absent any testimony to the contrary; 
5. There is no testimony that the defendant revoked or attempted to revoke his 
consent at any stage. 
6. The evidence is uncontroverted that the defendant reconfirmed his consent as the 
search proceed beyond the initial interior search. Officer Bushnell asked the 
defendant if he could look in a duffel bag that was in the trunk, and the defendant 
said "go ahead." 
B. 
The Second Prong Whether the Consent 
was Obtained by Police Exploitation of the Prior Illegality 
It is uncontested that Officer Bushnell, after making the stop, asked to search the 
vehicle. It is the defendant's position that the consent obtained is vitiated because the 
detention unlawfully continued after any lawful and proper purpose had passed. 
The state's interpretation of the second prong as set forth in Thurman is correct. 
Thurman does seem to base the need for suppression of evidence obtained from consent 
following illegal police action on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. Three 
factors are to be considered to determine whether or not to permit the introduction of the 
evidence resulting from consent after a police illegality--(l) "the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct," (2) the "temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent," and (3) 
"the presence of intervening circumstances. "Id. at 1263. 
The state claims that the Thurman court analysis of the first "purpose and 
flagrance" factor is controlling in the present case. The court analyzes this factor as follows: 
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. Thus, if the police had no "purpose" in engaging in 
the misconduct-for example, if the illegality arose because we later invalidated a 
statute on which the police had relied in good faith-suppression would have no 
deterrent value 
Id, at 1263-64 (citations omitted). If this is the case, then the court seems to indicate that 
further analysis is not required. The state claims that the present case is akin to this 
scenario. 
This case does not involve good faith reliance upon a statute which was later 
invalidated. There were, at best, conflicting cases in the Tenth Circuit and no Utah court 
ruling on the issue of whether the officer's questions was in violation of the defendant's 
rights. The instant case, though distinguishable on the facts, is sufficiently akin to 
"statute/revocation" scenario to merit the same analysis and the same result. While it may 
be a close call, it appears to this court that the state's emphasis on the "purpose and 
flagrancy" factor is accurate because of the facts brought out at the supplementary hearing. 
The state has de-emphasized the other important factors of temporaral proximity and the 
presence of intervening circumstances. But the state argues that because there was no clear 
court pronouncements regarding these types of questions asked by the arresting officer, his 
improper questioning was only a "technical" violation. This argument, thought fairly 
complex, appears to be sound in light of Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Brown v. 
Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, (1975). 
This court agrees with the state's position that Officer Bushnell could have 
detained defendant to further investigate defendant's failure to produce a vehicle registration 
form or evidence of his entitlement to use the vehicle. Cf. Robinson. 797 P.2d at 435 (once 
a driver has produced evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to 
proceed, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning). 
Consequently, under Walker Bushnell's conduct was arguably permissible because it did not 
delay the stop beyond the time necessary to investigate the issue of whether defendant had 
permissive use of the vehicle. 
Indeed, since the time of the stop that occurred here, the Court of Appeals has 
similarly recognized that the "running of a warrants check in the course of a traffic stop is 
permissible, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the original purpose of the stop. "Steve v. Figueroa-
Solorio. 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992). 
Two contemporaneous decisions from the California courts reflect a split similar to 
that evidenced in the decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Compare People 
v.Lusardi. 228 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 280 Cal. Rpter. 80, 81 (Cal. Super. 1991) ("Officers 
making a proper traffic (stop) cannot, on mere hunch, properly ask for consent to search (;) 
the consent obtained is vitiated because the detention unlawfully continued after any lawful 
and proper purpose has passed"); with People v. Galindo. 229 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1529, 
218 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (Cal. App. 1991) (Officer's post-citation inquiry of defendant -
which included whether there were any guns or drugs in the car and request for permission 
to search car-was proper). 
This court further agrees with the state's position, under the facts of this case, that 
Officer Bushnell could have detained defendant's vehicle based on defendant's failure to 
produce proper vehicle registration. He also could have continued to investigate his 
suspicion that the vehicle was stolen. Utah had yet to address the issue of whether it was 
permissible for an officer, in the course of a routine traffic stop, to ask the question posed by 
Bushnell. In light of the conflicting opinions from other courts on the issue presented, it 
cannot be said that the trooper's asking defendant whether there were any weapons or 
narcotics in the vehicle constituted flagrant misconduct or even a negligent violation of the 
law. Moreover, the encounter was- not merely a routine traffic stop, but instead involved 
defendant's failure to produce a vehicle registration form and to demonstrate permissive use 
of the vehicle beyond asserting that a friend identified only as "Bill" had loaned him the car. 
Since this case is akin to one in which "the illegality arose because (a court) later 
invalidated a statue on which the police had relied in good faith (;) suppression would 
(therefore) have no deterrent value." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1264 (citation omitted). 
Consequently, the absence of a temporal break or other intervening circumstance between the 
asking of the improper question and defendant's consent to search in inconsequential. See 
generally. Brown. 422 U.S. at 611-12. 
This court fully recognizes that its principal focus on the "purpose and flagrancy of 
the official misconduct" may result in an additional remand to further examine the "temporal 
proximity of the illegality and the consent" factor as well as "the presence of intervening 
circumstance" factor. Nonetheless, this court has principally focused on "the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct" factor because of the unique facts established at the 
supplemental evidentiary hearing. Consider: 
1. At the time of the stop, July 20, 1991, there was no written or verbal policy of 
the Utah Highway Patrol, or the officer's department, proscribing an inquiry of a 
driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs or narcotics in the 
vehicle. 
2. Departmental policy allowed Officer Bushnell to ask personal questions at the 
time of a traffic stop; the questions were not scripted. 
3. The questions posed to the driver of this vehicle were those routinely asked in 
his law enforcement practice. This driver was not singled out for any reason. 
4. Officer Bushnell adjusts his law enforcement practices based up training, advice 
from the county attorney, based upon Utah Highway Patrol directives and based 
upon court decisions. 
5. He was not aware through these educational and training efforts as of July 20, 
1991, that any law, statute, court case prohibited or called into question his inquiry 
regarding contraband in a vehicle or a request to search. As of July 20, 1991, he 
acted in conformity with his training and legal advice. 
6. Lastly, and most importantly, it is stressed that Officer Bushnell has abandoned 
this procedure in light of court decisions handed down since July 20, 1991. State v. Godina-
Luna 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). No one would suggest that law enforcement officers 
should be clairvoyant enough to divine future appellate decisions. 
It is clear that the suppression of the evidence in this case would, therefore, have 
absolutely no deterent effect whatsoever because this officer's routine has long since 
comported with new caselaw which gave him guidance. This court concludes that since there 
were no clear court pronouncements as of July 20, 1991, regarding these type of questions 
asked by this officer, his improper questioning was only a "technical" violation. A technical 
violation does not necessarily require suppression of the seized cocaine, because it is clear 
that here would be no deterrent effect. Officer Bushnell long ago abandoned these inquiries 
when the position was clarified. His practice has been consistent with law. The deterrence 
rationale discussed in Arroyo is mooted by his volunteer abandonment of the challenged 
inquiry. No deterrent purpose in implicated or served in this case by suppressing the 
cocaine. 
This court characterizes the nature and degree of the prior illegality as technical and 
not flagrant or egregious. It does not rise to the level of willful or even negligent 
misconduct even though Officer Bushnell exceeded the permissible scope of detention. 
Decision 
Based upon the above facts and discussion, Officer Bushnell could have properly 
detained the defendant to verify his entitlement to utilize the vehicle even though he exceeded 
the scope of detention when he asked Mr. Ziegleman whether there were any weapons or 
narcotics in the vehicle. As of July 20, 1991, that inquiry was not proscribed by Utah 
caselaw, by statute, or by departmental policy and was, therefore, arguably proper under the 
law as of that date. 
Under the reasoning of Arroyo, as recently "clarified" by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Thurman. defendants volunteer and unequivocable consent to search was not obtained by 
law enforcement exploitation of a prior illegality. In light of the discussion above, there 
would be absolutely no deterrent effect accomplished by suppressing the cocaine seized from 
the vehicle. 
Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied and the clerk of the court is 
instructed to set this case for jury trial forthwith. 
Dated this day of May, 1994. 
cc: counsel 
-; r, 
TODD A. UTZINGER (6047) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
IN.THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
;o i 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT LEE ZIEGLEMAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
CASE NO. 82E 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
For the reasons stated in the Court's May 27, 1994 
"Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress," defendant's motion to 
suppress should be and hereby is DENIED. 
Dated this pLC day of July, 1994. 
BY THE COURT 
